Abstract: In this Essay, we compare U.S. patent litigation across districts and consider possible explanations for the Eastern District of Texas's popularity with patent plaintiffs. Rather than any one explanation, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages-particularly with respect to the relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction-that make it predictably expensive for accused infringers to defend patent suits filed in East Texas. These findings tend to support ongoing efforts to pass patent reform legislation that would presumptively stay discovery in patent suits pending claim construction and motions to transfer or dismiss. However, we also observe that judges in the Eastern District of Texas tend to exercise their discretion in ways that dampen the effect of prior legislative and judicial reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits. Given the broad discretion courts have to control how cases proceed, this additional finding suggests that legislation restricting venue in patent cases may well be the single most effective reform available to Congress.
INTRODUCTION
After two terms of serious congressional interest in patent reform, including the introduction of roughly twenty competing bills, 1 only only one piece of prospective reform legislation still stands a reasonable chance of passage: the VENUE Act. 2 Introduced in March by Senators Flake, Gardner, and Lee, the bill would (with few exceptions) limit where patent suits can be filed to only those districts in which the accused infringer is incorporated or in which either party has a "regular and established physical facility" for research or production. 3 Many predict that, despite the eventual failures of the many bills that came before, this rather brief piece of legislation has a legitimate shot at passing through Congress by the end of 2016.
Though you won't find it anywhere in the bill's text, the VENUE Act's target is crystal clear: the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, a court made infamous as the location of choice for America's "patent trolls," companies formed solely for the purpose of monetizing patent rights through litigation, often using methods that seem to leverage the costs and burdens of litigation more so than the value of the patented technology. (Mar. 28, 2016) , http://www.patentdocs.org/2016/03/thevenue-act-a-last-ditch-attempt-at-patent-reform.html. 3 S. 2733, supra, at § 2(a). This is not the first time Congress has considered venue reform for patent cases. Most recently, a patent-specific venue provision was included in the ultimately unsuccessful Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. §8(a) (2006) . 4 For a general overview of how non-practicing patent holders can impose asymmetric costs in patent litigation and thereby induce nuisance value settlements, see Informational Hearing on Patent Assertion Entities before the California Assembly Select Committee on High Technology (Oct 30, 2013) (statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138. 5 As Justice Scalia once famously referred to the district. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) In this Essay, we take a close, up-to-date empirical look at how U.S. patent litigation plays out in districts across the nation and consider the extent to which the Eastern District of Texas's reputation is justified.
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While the appeal of the Eastern District to patent plaintiffs is undeniable (almost 44 percent of all patent cases in 2015 were filed in the district), a simple explanation for the district's popularity is surprisingly hard to articulate. Though we find evidence that the Eastern District of Texas is relatively plaintiff-friendly in certain respects, we also observe that allegedly "defendant-friendly" jurisdictions 12 such as the Northern District of California have characteristics that in many respects are quite similar. 6 There is at least some evidence that the people of East Texas, if not also the judiciary, recognize and welcome the economics benefits that come from the local patent litigation boom. For example, Tyler4Tech, "a consortium of Tyler, Texas' local civic, education and private enterprise leaders, companies and organizations," touts on its website the region's "plaintiff-friendly local rules, speedy dispositions, and principled jurors who understand the value of Intellectual Property. Rather than any one of the traditional narratives explaining the appeal of East Texas, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages, particularly with respect to the timing and success rate of important pretrial events. To borrow a shopworn phrase, the devil is in the details-specifically the nitty gritty details of seemingly mundane procedural choices, like the relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction. This observation suggests to us that, among reforms like those included in the Innovation Act and other recent omnibus patent reform bills, 14 mandatory delays in discovery may be the most effective at protecting companies from abusive patent enforcement in East Texas and elsewhere.
However, we also find evidence that judges in the Eastern District of Texas have generally exercised their discretion in the past in ways that dampen the effect of prior patent reform measures and Supreme Court opinions that would otherwise have shifted leverage in patent suits away from "trolls" and toward accused infringers. This observation leads us to the conclusion that there may well be no simple fix, apart from venue reform, that will end the Eastern District of Texas's popularity with patent plaintiffs. 18 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that "[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) states that, for venue purposes, a corporate defendant "shall be deemed to reside in any district . . . within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State." As interpreted by the Federal Circuit, these statutory rules make jurisdiction for patent suits proper in any federal district in which the accused product is sold. In re T.C. Heartland, LLC, No. 2016-105, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016) (stating that jurisdiction exists "where a nonresident defendant purposefully shipped accused products into the forum through an established distribution channel and the cause of action for patent infringement was alleged to arise out of those activities"). As a result, a patentee contemplating suit against a national retailer, or the producer of any of its products, can essentially file suit in the district of its choice. 19 According to Lex Machina, between 2014 and mid-2016 Judge Gilstrap saw 3,166 new patent suits, more than the combined total of all district courts in California, Florida, and New York: 2,656. Judge Gilstrap's popularity is attributable, at least in part, to the fact that he is currently assigned 95 percent of all civil cases filed in the Marshall Division. U. In contrast to the Northern District of California, which is home to a population of over 6.2 million residents, the Eastern District of Texas's population is (despite spanning three times as many counties) under 3.9 million. 21 Marshall, Texas, where almost a third of all patent suits are filed today, 22 has a population just shy of 25,000.
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In short, rather than being a jurisdiction of convenience for America's tech industry, the Eastern District has attracted the majority of all patent suits in the U.S. despite lacking its own technology hub. 24 ability to select which judge will hear their case (with a high degree of probability) by filing suit in a division that assigns a large percentage of its civil docket to a particular judge. In addition to its sheer size, the population of cases in East Texas is also noteworthy for its composition. Table 2 shows that, far from a random assortment of cases, the Eastern District of Texas's caseload skews heavily toward computing and telecommunications technology, and is almost entirely made up of cases filed by patent assertion entities (PAEs)-companies that exist to monetize patents, rather than commercialize the technology they cover. While cases involving pharmaceutical and medical patents are primarily located in close proximity to where those industries are most concentrated-in California and New Jersey 27 -the same is not true for patents that cover computing technology. None of the U.S. computer 25 LexMachina, All Court Case Filings by Year: All Patent Case Filed by Year, https://law.lexmachina.com/court/table#Patent-tab (last accessed August 21, 2016). 26 These are counts of the total number of congressionally authorized judgeships in each district. U.S. Courts, Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships -District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-historyauthorized-judgeships-district-courts (last accessed August 21, 2016). The total count includes district judgeships on territorial courts. Note that not all judgeships were filled during the entire period of this study. 27 Of the top ten pharmaceutical companies ranked by revenue earned in the U.S. in 2014, five are based in California and two in New Jersey. industry's most prolific patent applicants has so much as a single office in East Texas.
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The gulf between the locus of original innovation and of later patent assertion is likely explained in part by the fact that so few cases filed in East Texas are filed by companies that actually produce and sell technology. Instead, cases in the Eastern District of Texas are overwhelmingly filed by entities created expressly for the purpose of litigating patent suits. No other district comes even close. Because these parties generally lack a principal place of business-or, for that matter, assets other than the patents in suitthey have the flexibility to form an LLC and file suit wherever they deem most advantageous for litigation purposes. Finally, it is worth noting that the Eastern District of Texas's popularity is almost entirely driven by the preferences of patent enforcers, not those of accused infringers. Though it has been suggested by some that the Eastern District may be popular due to a general preference for efficiency and judicial expertise among all patent litigants, 31 case filing statistics do not bear this out. As shown above in Table 2 , the Eastern District of Texas sees declaratory judgment filings at a rate well below the national average. In other 30 We are grateful to Unified Patents for making this data available to us. We adopted the words, when accused infringers are given the opportunity to select the venue for litigation, they disproportionately choose a different court.
Viewed together, these findings give us pause. While the Eastern District's popularity alone may not be cause for serious concern, 32 we find that the court's appeal is not shared by all kinds of litigants. Since 2014, more than 90 percent of patent suits filed in East Texas were filed by PAEs enforcing high tech patents. Accused infringers, by contrast, chose to file suit in East Texas at a rate less than one tenth that seen in other districts. Moreover, there appears to be nothing special about the East Texas economy that explains this dichotomy.
Rather, cases litigated in the Eastern District of Texas overwhelmingly involve patents covering inventions made elsewhere, asserted against parties located elsewhere, and by plaintiffs with little or no connection to the region prior to filing a complaint. 33 
II. WHY IS THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SO POPULAR?
While the Eastern District's popularity with patent enforcers has been well documented for years, there is less certainty on the reasons why this district has become the venue of choice for patent monetization. Reviewing the evidence, we find a number of plausible answers. However, we ultimately conclude that the answer is likely more complex than traditional narratives suggest.
A. Is the Eastern District of Texas a "Rocket Docket"?
One common explanation for the Eastern District of Texas's popularity is its reputation as a fast docket-i.e., a jurisdiction where cases proceed to trial quickly, which in turn allows plaintiffs to recover faster while placing greater pressure on defendants to settle. 34 Many current and former East Texas 32 In theory, at least. In practice, we question whether it is ever possible for a single judge or small group of judges to effectively oversee many thousands of lawsuits at once, regardless of the causes of action alleged. 33 Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 255-56 ("[P]atent cases generally have a tenuous connection to the Eastern District based on the sale of a few allegedly infringing products somewhere in the district."). 34 See, e.g., Creswell, supra note _ ("What's behind the rush to file patent lawsuit here [in the Eastern District of Texas]? A combination of quick trials and plaintiff-friendly juries, many lawyers say."); Rogers, supra note _ (attributing the Eastern District of Texas's early popularity with patent plaintiffs to the district's lack of a criminal docket and, thus, relative speed in civil matters); Jeff Bounds, New Patent Infringement Lawsuits in East Texas Shatter Records, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 18, 2015 ("The Eastern District of Texas became popular with patent lawyers a decade ago when the federal judges there created a so-called judges have reinforced this reputation by publicly expressing a preference for getting cases to trial, and quickly. 35 We find support for this hypothesis, but less than many might expect.
First, we do find that patent litigation generally moves quickly in the Eastern District of Texas. Eastern Texas patent cases tend to settle early (and at high rates), and when cases do not settle, they generally make it to trial faster than patent suits litigated in other courts. As shown below in Table 3 , patent cases in the Eastern District that go to trial tend to make it to a jury in less than two years, about 5 months faster than the nationwide median. Among districts that saw at least 15 trials in the last two and a half years, the Eastern District has a median time-to-trial that is over two months faster than the next fastest court.
rocket docket, allowing patent holders to move through the pretrial process more quickly and get to trial sooner."). 35 We also observe that cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas tend to reach a faster conclusion regardless of the manner in which they are terminated. Among all cases terminated during the period we study, those in the Eastern District conclude about six months faster than those in the District of Delaware and close to two months faster than the national median.
Looking just at those cases that settle, we again see a similar pattern. Among all cases settled between 2014 and mid-2016, those in the Eastern District settled about four months faster than in the next most popular venue, the District of Delaware, and over two months faster than the national median. Looking closer still to cases that settled relatively quickly-within one year of 36 We collected these statistics using Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days to termination, settlement, or trial for all cases in the listed populations that were terminated, settled, or tried between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016. 37 Statistics for the Southern District of Florida are skewed heavily by the actions of one patentee, Shipping and Transit, LLC (FKA ArrivalStar), which filed 110 suits in the district during the period of our study. These suits also terminated exceptionally quickly, settling after a median of just 65 days. For background on Shipping and Transit LLC's litigation tactics, see, e.g., Jacqueline Bell, Notorious IP Plaintiff ArrivalStar Back On The Hunt, Law360, Mar. 5, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/628275/notorious-ip-plaintiffarrivalstar-back-on-the-hunt.
filing-we also see a disproportionate number in the Eastern District of Texas. While about seventy percent of patent cases nationwide settled in their first year, the Eastern District saw more than eighty percent of its cases end within a year after filing. In the District of Delaware, by comparison, only half of cases settled within one year. In fact, with the exception of the Southern District of Florida, which saw less than one-tenth as many terminations and trials during the same period of time, the Eastern District of Texas is the fastest venue among the top ten most popular to settlement, to trial, and to overall termination.
That said, the Eastern District is only marginally faster than many other districts, and it is not the overall fastest. Among the most popular districts for patent suits, that distinction goes to the Southern District of Florida, and nationwide to the Eastern District of Virginia, the original "rocket docket," where patent cases make it to trial more than twice as fast as those in the Eastern District of Texas. 38 Moreover, the Eastern District of Texas's popularity with patentees has continued to grow over time despite the district's rising case load and consequent drop in speed. 39 If speed were patentees' primary criteria for venue selection, we would expect to see cases filed across a larger number of districts in a manner that achieves a more natural equilibrium.
B. Are East Texas Judges and Juries Patentee-Friendly?
Yet another common explanation for East Texas's dominant position in patent litigation is a belief that the district is home to judges and jurors who 38 are unusually sympathetic to plaintiffs. 40 Indeed, the district was a popular venue for mass tort cases before the rise of patent suits and many lawyers and judges in the area cut their teeth litigating these cases. 41 We also find statistical support for this hypothesis, but again less than conventional wisdom might suggest.
First, as shown below in Table 4 , we find that judges in the Eastern District are less likely than their counterparts in other parts of the nation to grant motions to transfer. In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has taken the extraordinary stop of issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the Eastern District to transfer a patent case four times since 2014, something it has otherwise done just once during the same period across all cases litigated in the other 93 districts. 42 In addition, we observe that when East Texas judges do transfer cases, they do so much later in the pre-trial process. Cases transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas are over twice as old as those transferred out of the Northern and Central Districts of California. Compared to the national average, the Eastern District of Texas takes more than 100 days longer to grant motions to transfer venue. 40 he perception, and reality, that the district is favorable to plaintiffs. Historically, Eastern District patent cases have been propelled quickly toward high win rates and large damage awards favoring plaintiffs."); Bounds, supra note _ ("'While the Eastern District of Texas may not be the rocket docket it once was, and even though the size of jury verdicts has generally declined in recent years, the Eastern District of Texas still boasts an environment that is very friendly towards plaintiffs . . . .'" (quoting Tyler T. VanHoutan, Partner, Winston & Strawn)); When Patents Attack!, supra note _ ("Many people say that it has to do with juries in Marshall, they're famously plaintiff-friendly, friendly to patent owners trying to get a large verdict."). 41 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 272 ("Long before East Texas was a hotbed for patent litigation, it was a focal point for personal injury, products liability, and medical malpractice litigation, including major class actions against the asbestos, pharmaceutical, and tobacco industries."). In fact, many attribute the rise of patent litigation in East Texas at least in part to the impact that tort reform had on the local tort docket. We also see that East Texas judges are disproportionately unlikely to grant motions for summary judgment of non-infringement or invalidity. As shown below in Table 5 , judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant summary judgment in defendants' favor at a rate of about half the national average. A motion for summary judgment filed by an accused infringer litigating in a court outside the Eastern District is over 20 percentage points more likely to be granted at least in part than one filed in the Eastern District of Texas. As with motions to transfer, we also see that the Eastern District of Texas takes an unusually long time to grant summary judgment. Compared 43 We calculated these statistics by searching DocketNavigator for motions to transfer filed between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
Here and throughout, we adopt DocketNavigator's conventions for determining whether a motion was granted and/or denied: "Granted Includes orders (i) granting a motion, and (ii) recommending that a motion be granted. Denied Includes orders (i) denying a motion, (ii) denying a motion as moot, (iii) denying a motion without prejudice, (iv) striking a motion, (v) striking a motion without prejudice, (vi) vacating a motion, (vii) recommending that a motion be denied, and (viii) recommending that a motion be denied as moot. Partial Includes orders (i) denying or granting a motion in part, or (ii) recommending that a motion be denied and granted in part. Other Includes orders which were not included in Granted, Denied or Partial." DocketNavigator, Case Management, https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats (last accessed Sept. 2, 2016). 44 We collected this statistic from Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days to termination for cases in the listed populations that were terminated due to inter-district transfers between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
the Northern and Central Districts of California, the gap exceeds a year in duration. Even relative to the national median, the Eastern District is more than 100 days slower. Next, because East Texas patent cases are both unlikely to be transferred out of the district and unlikely to be completely resolved by summary judgement, they are (unless settled first) disproportionately likely to go to trial. As shown below in Table 6 , cases tried in the Eastern District are relatively likely to be tried to a jury, and East Texas juries are in turn disproportionately likely to side with patentees. That said, Eastern District jury verdicts are far from the most plaintiff-friendly in the country, and East Texas juries find for the patentee only slightly more often than the national average. Moreover, while damages awarded by East Texas juries exceed the national average by a large margin, median jury awards in East Texas are actually quite modest-a 45 We calculated these statistics by searching DocketNavigator for motions for summary judgement filed by accused infringers in cases in the listed populations between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016. 46 We collected this statistic from Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days to termination in cases resolved by summary judgment (in favor of either party) between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016. fact suggesting that, while large awards are certainly possible in East Texas patent trials, they are relatively rare. Finally, the district's high reversal rate on appeal tends to support the belief that the district is too friendly to patent plaintiffs. . 48 We collected the number of trials and win rate from Lex Machina, looking at all trials conducted between 2014 and mid-2016. 49 We collected the percentage of jury trials by searching DocketNavigator for verdicts and findings of fact issued in cases in the listed populations between 2014 and mid-2016. Thus, this statistic does not include any trials that settled or otherwise ended prematurely before a verdict was issued. 50 We collected data on damages awards by searching DocketNavigator for awards issued in cases in the listed populations between 2014 and mid-2016. These statistics exclude any amounts awarded in default judgments. Overall, we find that while the Eastern District has among the most patentee-friendly outcomes in the U.S. However, we also observe that it is comparable in many respects to other districts that see far fewer filings. And in some respects, cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas actually have 51 Interestingly, early on, many pointed to the Eastern District of Texas's low rate of reversal as evidence of a lack of bias in favor of patentees. See Pusey, supra note _, at 1D ("Judge worse outcomes for patentees. Perhaps most notably, both the District of Delaware and that Northern District of California saw higher median and mean jury awards during our period of study, and both district held almost as many trials as the Eastern District despite seeing far fewer filings. Together, these findings once again make us skeptical that a marginal tendency to favor patent enforcers in substantive decision-making is the driving force behind the Eastern District's popularity. Though relative advantages on the merits likely play a role in the district's dominance of filings, they do not strike us as sufficiently stark on net to account for such a great disparity in filings.
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C. Discovery Deadlines and Pretrial Motions Practice
Ultimately we find neither traditional explanation particularly satisfying when viewed in isolation. Rather, we conclude that the true appeal of East Texas is more subtle and stems from the combined effect of a number of marginal procedural advantages, including the relative timing of discovery, rulings on procedural motions, and judicial scrutiny of infringement claims. The numbers shown in parentheses represent the median number of days from the complaint to each of the deadlines set in our sample of scheduling orders. In addition, we have added to each timeline the median number of days from filing to a ruling on motions to transfer for each judge's respective district. As the figure shows, discovery both begins and ends earlier in cases litigated before Judge Gilstrap. Every discovery deadline occurs earlier on Judge Gilstrap's scheduling order, generally by 50 to 100 days. In fact, these figures probably understate the differential in practice because, in our experience, Judge Gilstrap is less likely than most judges to allow parties to later extend these deadlines.
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As a result, parties sued for infringement in the Eastern District begin to incur discovery costs-the single largest expense in patent litigation 57 -faster than similarly situated defendants litigating elsewhere in the country.
i. Discovery, Transfer, and Markman Dates
At the same time, the districts also differ with respect to the timing of two other important pretrial events: rulings on motions to transfer and the date of claim construction, or Markman, 58 hearings. Compared to their colleagues in 56 This was also true of other former Eastern District judges who were popular with patent case filers during their time on the bench. See Gerardi, supra note _ ("We have firm trial settings. I seldom grant a motion for continuance, thus one will get a fairly quick trial." (quoting Judge Leonard Davis, retired)). 57 According to a survey of IP litigators, the median cost to defend a mid-sized patent suit (i.e., a suit with between $10 and $25 million at stake) through the end of discovery is $1.9 million, while the total cost through the end of trial is $3.1 million. Am. Intell. Prop. L. Assoc., 2015 Report of the Economic Survey I-111. 58 Named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is a question of law to be resolved by the court).
the District of Delware, judges in the Eastern District of Texas take a relatively long time to rule on motions to transfer venue. By the time cases erroneously filed in East Texas are transferred to a new venue, most are a year old. By contrast, judges in the District of Delaware generally transfer cases about two months faster.
Moreover, the size of this gap alone understates the true impact that this dichotomy has on accused infringers. Because Judge Gilstrap also orders that document production be complete within about ten months of filing, the relative delay in transfers means that any defendant sued in the Eastern District (even those with no real connection to the venue) must generally complete document production according to the rules of that district, which (in addition to starting early) are unusually broad in scope. Judge Gilstrap's sample discovery order, for example, requires production or inspection of "all documents . . . that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses," a requirement written to be so broad that it "obviate[s] the need for requests for production." In addition, the relatively early deadlines for the completion of all other forms of discovery also weigh against accused infringers. In a median patent case litigated in the Eastern District of Texas, fact discovery will end 66 days sooner, and expert discovery 157 days sooner, than in the District of Delaware. As a result, otherwise similarly situated defendants litigating in East Texas will be required to incur the high costs of discovery more quickly than their counterparts litigating elsewhere. Once again, the duration of this gap alone understates the impact on accused infringers. As shown in Figure 1 , both districts also differ with respect to the relatively timing of discovery cutoffs and the Markman hearing. As a result, even though Judge Gilstrap generally schedules Markman hearings two to three months earlier than Judge Stark, litigants in Delaware nonetheless have three months longer to conduct discovery post-Markman. In our experience, accused infringers (but not plaintiffs looking for a quick settlement) strongly prefer to conduct the bulk of their own discovery only after the court has ruled on the scope of the asserted claims. Due to the inherent indeterminacy of patent claim scope, it is often unclear how a case will be litigated on the merits until after claim construction takes place. 61 As a result, Judge Gilstrap's scheduling practices often force defendants to decide whether to cram the most crucial aspects of their own discovery into the short window following claim construction or, instead, to shoot in the dark before important terms have been defined.
ii. Predictably Expensive
It is the combined effect of the series of procedural shifts described above that, we believe, actually explains the bulk of the Eastern District's popularity and its case composition. In combination, East Texas's tendency to impose relatively fast and firm discovery deadlines and to issue substantive rulings relatively late in cases facilitates precisely the kind of high volume, low value patent litigation that the Eastern District of Texas has become infamous for. 62 This is because the relative timing of discovery, transfer, and Markman ensures that, by virtue of being sued in the Eastern District, an accused infringer will be forced to incur large discovery costs, regardless of the case's connection to East Texas or the merits of its infringement contentions.
The result is an opportunity for patentees to file large numbers of cases and offer to settle them for amounts few defendants will find it rational to decline. And, indeed, that is what we see in the data discussed above: the Eastern District is uniquely attractive to plaintiffs that (i) do not sell products of their own, and thus have few documents of their own to produce, (ii) enforce high tech patents that can be asserted broadly against many accused infringers, and (iii) generally settle quickly. As shown below in Table 8 , five of the ten patentees that filed the most suits during the period of our study filed exclusively in the Eastern District of Texas and another two filed the majority . 62 As then-Chief Judge Leonard Davis once aptly put it: "If I could sum it up [i.e. why the Eastern District is so popular] in one word, I would say predictability." Gerardi, supra note _. As mentioned supra in note _, this predictability includes patentees' ability to select (with a very high degree of probability) which Eastern District judge will be assigned to their cases, something that isn't possible elsewhere in the country. See Symposium, supra note _, at 257-58 (explaining that one reason the Eastern District of Texas is more popular than other district with similar local patent rules is "that there is something happening in the Eastern District that you do not have in the big commercial areas-lawyers generally know who their judge is going to be in the Eastern District of Texas" (statement of Mike McKool, Partner, McKool Smith)). Accordingly, patentees who wish to take advantage of Judge Gilstrap's standard docket control and discovery orders can do so today with 95 percent certainty by filing suit in Marshall.
or plurality of their suits in East Texas. 63 Law firms have also specialized to meet the needs of high-volume litigants like these. The Tadlock Law Firm, for example, has represented patentees in over one thousand cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas since 2012. Those cases have a median time-totermination of just 172 days, and only three have gone to trial.
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Though we lack data on settlement amounts, it is our personal experience that many cases in the Eastern District of Texas settle for between $30,000 and $100,000, amounts that reflect more than anything a fraction of the defendants' anticipated cost of defense. 65 We think it likely that the tendency toward large numbers of small settlements also explains, at least in part, the relatively low level of damage awards that we see in most East Texas trials. Because cases are litigated in this fashion, by the time many patents are tried to a jury (if ever) in the Eastern District of Texas, those patents have been licensed numerous times for small amounts. If entered into evidence, these prior licenses make it hard for the patentee to credibly ask the jury to award a large sum of damages. 63 See also John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 Geo. L.J. 677 (2011) (finding that patent plaintiffs that sued eight or more times were more likely than other patent enforcers to settle and also much more likely to lose on the merits of their cases if pushed to a trial or judgment). 64 We collected this information from Lex Machina by searching for firms that have served as counsel in the largest number of patent suits. 
III. WHY HAVEN'T RECENT REFORMS AND APPELLATE OPINIONS REDUCED THE EASTERN DISTRICT'S POPULARITY?
This conclusion, however, raises the question of why reforms enacted in recent years-reforms targeted at PAEs and overbroad high tech patentshave not already put an end to East Texas's dominance. In this Part, we review evidence that judges in the Eastern District of Texas have generally ruled in ways that have minimized the effect of patent reform measures passed by Congress and changes in the law articulated by higher courts. We find that East Texas judges are disproportionately unlikely to stay cases pending postgrant challenges, to require that patentees litigate individual cases against individual defendants, to grant early motions to dismiss on patentable subject matter grounds, and to award attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
A. The America Invents Act
In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA), the largest set of reforms to U.S. patent law since 1952.
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Among the reforms enacted in the AIA were two specifically designed to curb the practice of filing patent suits in order to extract settlements that largely reflect defendants' desire to avoid the high cost of defense, rather than the strength and value of the asserted claims. 66 The data in this table relies on a combination of information obtained from Unified Patents and Lex Machina. We obtain the names of the top 10 filers from Unified and collected case level information by searching Lex Machina for each party's name. One such reform was the expansion of procedures for administratively challenging the validity of issued patents. Such procedures are designed to allow the public to eliminate patents they believe are invalid using patent office procedures that are faster, less expensive, and more broadly available than litigation in federal district court.
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So far, the new procedures created by the AIA-particularly inter partes review and covered business method review-have proven very potent and, today, it is common for defendants to seek to invalidate patents asserted against them in court. 69 Concurrent with such challenges, defendants regularly file motions to stay patent suits for the roughly 18-month duration of the challenge.
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In conjunction with litigation stays, post grant challenges allow an accused infringer to invalidate weak patent rights without first incurring the high cost of discovery.
However, as shown below in Table 9 , judges in the Eastern District of Texas are less likely than their counterparts in other parts of the country to stay lawsuits pending patent office challenges of the patent-in-suit. Judges in the District of Delaware and Northern District of California grant motions to stay, at least in part, over 70 percent of the time. By contrast, the grant rate in the Eastern District of Texas is less than 58 percent. As a result, defendants sued in East Texas are more likely to continue to rack up litigation costs early in cases, regardless of the asserted patent's validity. 68 The AIA also sought to limit the ability of patentees to accuse a large number of parties of infringement in a single suit. Pre-AIA it was common for litigious patentees to sue many-sometimes dozens of-unrelated parties in a single suit.
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This practice, while efficient for the patentee, often disadvantaged defendants sued en masse.
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Suing large numbers of parties in a single case, for example, allowed patentees to leverage one defendant's local ties to help keep litigation against many others in East Texas. In addition, patentees also benefited from rules restricting all co-defendants to a single brief or allotment of time for argument or trial. In the AIA, Congress sought to limit plaintiffs' ability to file these suits by changing the rules for joinder in patent cases.
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As the law reads today, joinder of multiple accused infringers 71 However, as shown below in Table 10 , it has become common in the Eastern District of Texas for individual patent cases filed by the same plaintiff to be consolidated post-filing back into what is effectively a single suit for pretrial purposes. Though grant rates are relatively high for these motions nationwide, judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant them virtually every time. In addition, while these motions are relatively rare in most other districts, they are common in East Texas. On a per case basis, the Eastern District of Texas sees three times more motions to consolidate than the District of Delaware and Northern District of California. In absolute terms, the Eastern District of Texas sees more motions to consolidate than all other districts combined. In fact, these statistics likely understate the gap between districts because, in our experience, it is common for judges in the Eastern District to consolidate cases sua sponte, without a motion ever being filed. While other districts generally embraced the new reforms, judges in East Texas were more reluctant to break with tradition and, as a result, the Eastern District retained and attracted cases filed by patentees who also preferred the old way.
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B. Recent Supreme Court Opinions
In addition to congressional action, the Supreme Court has also recently modified several patent law doctrines in ways that tend to favor accused infringers. In these areas as well, we observe that the Eastern District of Texas has been reluctant embrace change.
First, in Alice v. CLS Bank the Supreme Court tackled the patentability of software, a topic that had deeply divided the Federal Circuit for years.
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As interpreted by lower courts, Alice all but precludes the patentability of business methods, including those implemented in software. 80 Another result of the case was that, soon thereafter, many courts began disposing cases asserting business method patents on the pleadings, without need for discovery or other pretrial proceedings. In our experience, this type of quick adjudication generally allows for business method cases to be defended for five figures in costs, far more efficiently even than filing an inter partes or covered business method review. judges in the Eastern District of Texas have been reluctant to embrace this new practice. On a per case basis, defendants in the Eastern District of Texas filed three to four times fewer motions to dismiss than those sued in other popular districts. We do not believe this lack of motions to reflect a lack of merit in potential arguments, but rather an understanding that such motions would not be viewed favorably by the court. For example, for a period of time, Judge Gilstrap took the exceptional step of requiring parties to request permission in writing to file an early motion to dismiss based on Alice.
82
In addition to seeing a relatively small number of early Alice motions, judges in the Eastern District also grant these motions at a relatively low rate-ten percentage points below the national average. Moreover, if we are right about litigants' reluctance to file these motions in the first place, those motions filed in East Texas likely represent among the strongest motions that might otherwise have been filed and, thus, the figures report here likely understates to true gap among districts' grant rates. 84 The decision came at a time when Congress was considering the Innovation Act, which would have made fee awards all but mandatory in patent suits, and the Court may well have been influenced by congressional interest in deterring abusive patent assertion. 85 Since that time, fee awards in patent suits have become both more common and more substantial in size. 86 However, as shown below in Table 12 , this shift has not been uniform across districts. Compared to the national average, the Eastern District of Texas has seen fewer motions (per case), granted motions at a lower rate, and awarded smaller amounts for those that were granted. Perhaps most remarkable is the dichotomy with respect to the size of awards given. Among the most popular districts for patent litigation, the Eastern District is the only to have median and mean awards that fail to break into the six figures. In short, while both Congress and the Supreme Court have modified patent law and procedure in ways that tend to benefit accused infringers, the manner in which cases are conducted in the Eastern District of Texas has dulled the effects of these modifications. While some have asserted that the Eastern District of Texas has developed practices designed to protect the local market for patent litigation, 88 our data is insufficient to support such an assertion. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Eastern District of Texas's popularity has only grown in the years since the AIA's passage.
IV. ANALYSIS
Viewed as a whole, our findings suggest to us that Congress should consider placing new limits on discovery and venue in patent suits. Though patent litigation in the Eastern District of Texas tends to favor patentees in several respects, our observations lead us to conclude that the driving force behind the jurisdiction's popularity is the combination of plaintiffs' ability to 87 All figures in this table were collected by searching DocketNavigator for motions for attorney's fees filed between 2014 and mid-2016 88 For a discussion of whether the judges of the Eastern District of Texas engage in intentional "forum selling" in order to attract patent litigation for the benefit of the local economy, themselves, and their families, see Klerman & Reilly, supra note _. impose early, broad discovery obligations on accused infringers and defendants' inability to obtain an early procedural or substantive victory through motion practice. Together, these facts make the jurisdiction attractive to PAEs with a high-volume, low-rate patent monetization strategy. Simply by filing a complaint in the Eastern District, these plaintiffs can predictably and consistently impose large costs on their opponents and leverage those costs to extract settlements that largely reflect a percentage of a defendant's expected litigation costs from virtually any infringer, no matter where they are located in the U.S.
One way to counteract this leverage-and in turn to shift the focus of patent suits from an accounting of discovery costs to an assessment of the merits of the claim-would be to place strict limits on discovery early in patent suits. Reforms like those found in various iterations of the Innovation Act strike us as particularly promising examples. As passed by the House in 2013, section 3(d) of the bill would have strictly limited discovery in patent suits prior to claim construction. 89 As reintroduced in 2015, a modified version of this subsection would have stayed discovery altogether pending resolution of pretrial motions, including motions to transfer and motions to dismiss on the pleadings. 90 Both reforms would have a significant impact on pretrial practice in the Eastern District of Texas. Today in the Eastern District of Texas defendants are generally required to complete document production-a task that alone can cost six-or even seven-figures 91 -well before the court has held a claim construction hearing, let alone made a ruling, and about fifty days before the court might grant a motion to transfer. Recent experience with rule changes in the District of Delaware also tends to suggest that reforms shifting the relative timing of substantive decisions and discovery can be quite effective. In 2014, Judges Stark and Robinson of the District of Delaware both modified their scheduling practices for patent cases to allow early claim construction decisions. 92 In response, case filings in Delaware fell precipitously, with most plaintiffs shifting their new cases to East Texas. 93 While demonstrating just how effective pretrial modifications can be, patentees' reaction to Delaware's rule change also reveals how permissive venue rules can easily scuttle otherwise effective reforms. If judges have discretion to implement the rules in ways that tend to dull their effectiveness, plaintiffs can and likely will flock to jurisdictions that fail to fully embrace reforms. The end result may well be a "race to the bottom" that exacerbates, rather than eases, the flow of cases to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. In the wake of the AIA and scheduling changes in the District of Delaware, this appears to be precisely what we see today in Marshall, Texas.
This fact, in turn, suggests to us that venue reform may be the single most effective reform available to policymakers. Procedural reforms, by their very nature, are hard to implement and even harder to police. Indeed, the discovery reforms found in both versions of the Innovation Act, though nominally mandatory, are each followed by a list of discretionary exceptions.
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Though reasonable on their face, exceptions like these nonetheless leave the door open for individual districts to exercise their discretion in a manner that reduced the impact of reforms and reinforces plaintiffs' desire to litigate there. One way to prevent a race to the bottom is to cancel the race altogether. Passing legislation like the VENUE Act would be a significant step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
Using recent data on patent litigation across the U.S., we examined the Eastern District of Texas's status as an outlier. While the district stands out greatly in terms of quantity of case filings, we see less clear evidence for a simple explanation. Though the Eastern District is relatively fast and relatively friendly to patentees on the merits of their claims, other popular districts often have comparable statistics and occasionally even surpass the http://www.natlawreview.com/article/times-they-are-changin-delaware-s-judge-stark-outlinesnew-patent-case-management-pr. 93 Eastern District, for example with respect to speed, number of trials, and size of jury verdicts.
Rejecting these traditional explanations as overly simplistic, we then took a look at the relative timing of pretrial litigation events. Here, we found that the patent plaintiffs suing in the Eastern District benefit from the district's combination of early, broad discovery deadlines with late action on motions to transfer, motions for summary judgment, and claim construction. Though our analysis is purely descriptive, we believe that the evidence points to this combination as the primary driving force behind the popularity of East Texas. A virtual guarantee that accused infringers will be forced to incur large discovery costs well before they are given a shot to move or win the case, opens the door for patentees to profitably pursue high volume, low value litigation and this is precisely the phenomenon that appears to drive the popularity of East Texas.
Consistent with our theory, case filings in East Texas are dominated by a relatively small number of frequent filers that virtually always settle quickly and, anecdotally, for relatively small sums. It should come as no surprise then that docket speed and merits decisions do not stand out in our study. These patentees care little about the timing of trial because they have little intention of ever making it that far. Likewise, they care little about the rate of success on summary judgment and in jury verdicts because they price their settlements at levels that primarily reflect expected litigation costs, not damages.
On the one hand, our conclusions are discouraging. Today, patentees can and often do seek out districts that offer procedural and substantive advantages, and are able to leverage these advantages to extract larger settlements from accused infringers. As a result, reforms that apply only in individual courts or that leave individual courts broad discretion to decide how general reforms will be implemented, may (despite reformers' best of intentions) ultimately serve to further exacerbate the accumulation of cases in plaintiff-friendly courts, as scheduling changes in Delaware and some portions of the AIA appear to have done for the Eastern District of Texas. In light of these considerations, venue reform stands out as an appealing solution that bypasses both plaintiffs' ability to "shop" for friendly venues and courts' ability to "market" their jurisdiction to a particular type of litigant. Alternatively, our findings suggest that, in order to be effective, reforms should be mandatory and crafted to limit courts' ability to modify or otherwise undermine them. Mandatory discovery delays like those included in the Innovation Act may be particularly effective.
At the same time, our findings are also encouraging. If problematic patent litigation largely stems from a small number of repeat litigants, then it may be possible to craft a simple, targeted solution. Relatively small shifts in the economics of patent litigation, provided they are unavoidable, could have outsized impact on the prevalence of cost-fueled patent suits. We believe that venue reform and mandatory discovery delays are two that Congress should give very serious consideration.
